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Abstract 
 
By using data from the latest wave of the Indonesia Life Family Survey, the present work 
investigates whether and to which extent child time allocation depends on the joint impact of 
liquidity constraints and risk attitudes. We employ a double selection model of school hours, by 
adding time preferences, risk attitudes and proxies of risks and shocks among the relevant 
regressors, and controlling for sample selection and endogeneity of liquidity constraints and school 
enrolment. To this aim, we exploit measures of time preferences and risk attitudes elicited from 
individuals’ responses to hypothetical gambles and consider the past occurrence of shocks to proxy 
the risk profiles of the households under the assumption that households use past income volatility 
to predict future volatility. It will be shown that, under liquidity constraints, risk averse parents raise 
a precautionary demand for education as an ex-ante risk coping strategy, so to insure future 
consumption through higher returns from their children’s work.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The economic literature investigating the determinants of child labor can be divided in two parallel, 
though separated, strands: one emphasizing the role of capital market failures; the other 
emphasizing the importance of subsistence concerns and parental preferences.  
The present work proposes an empirical framework to simultaneously account for both, by 
investigating whether and to which extent children’s time allocation depends either on the 
preclusion of borrowing possibilities, and on risk attitudes and time preferences. 
We deem that such an analysis provides relevant results to the existing literature which mostly 
ignore the possibility that time preferences, risk attitudes and the existence of borrowing constraints 
interplay in affecting school investments. On the one hand, the presence of borrowing constraints 
directly induce households to supply more child labor as a substitute for the optimal amount of 
borrowing. On the other hand, the preclusion of borrowing possibilities may indirectly affect school 
investments by influencing the likely impact of other characteristics on the same outcome. For 
example, it can be reasonably supposed that risk aversion affects the school investments of liquidity 
constrained households to a larger extent and therefore access to appropriate insurance markets 
discourage the use of child labor supply as a risk-coping strategy. 
This paper employs a double selection model of school hours, by adding time preferences, risk 
attitudes and proxies of risks and shocks among the relevant regressors, and controlling for sample 
selection and endogeneity of borrowing constraints and school enrolment. To this aim, we exploit 
measures of time preferences and risk attitudes elicited from individuals’ responses to hypothetical 
gambles and consider the past occurrence of shocks to proxy the risk profiles of the households 
under the assumption that households use past earnings volatility to predict future volatility.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the relevant literature about 
the impact of credit markets imperfections and parents’ preferences on schooling. In section 3, we 
develop a simple theoretical model to investigate the likely response of child time to parents’ risk 
and time preferences and whether this response depends on credit market conditions. Section 4 
presents the dataset and, specifically, how the key variables for risk and time preferences and 
exogenous income shocks are constructed. Section 5 outlines the hypotheses to be empirically 
tested. Section 6 discusses the empirical strategy used in the proceeding of the paper to verify our 
model’s predictions while sections 7 and 8 present the econometric regressions and results. Section 
9 concludes. 
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2. Related literature 
 
The analyses of the determinants of child time-use and the reasons why the supply of child labor  
significantly increases with household’s poverty have typically focused on the role of capital market 
failures, subsistence concerns and parental preferences. 
 
2.1.   The role of capital market failures 
 
The literature emphasizing the role of capital market failures on child labor and early education is 
extensive, both theoretically and empirically.  
Baland and Robinson (2000) show that child labor is inefficient when the family is so poor that the 
parents do not leave bequests to their children. By adopting a two-periods model, they show that, 
despite parental altruism, child labor is inefficient when it is used by parents as a substitute for 
negative bequests (to transfer income from children to parents), or as a substitute for borrowing (to 
transfer income from the future to the present). Pouliot (2006) introduces uncertainty to the Baland 
and Robinson’s model of child labor. He finds that, under non-borrowing restrictions, the set of 
conditions generating an inefficiently high level of child labor is determined by the presence of 
uncertain returns to human capital and incompleteness of insurance markets. Rajan (2001) adopts a 
two-periods model to study the relationship between income inequality and the incidence of child 
labor in presence of credit constraints. The model shows that, when individuals have different 
abilities, higher income inequality is associated with higher incidence of child labor. For each level 
of ability there is a threshold level of parental income such that households below that threshold 
send their children to work. Parsons and Goldin (1989) show that the sub-optimality of schooling 
investments is closely-related to the availability of efficient capital markets. The negative impact of 
credit constraints on investments in early education has been discussed also by Laitner (1997), 
Parsons and Goldin (1989), and Jacoby and Skoufias (1997).  
There is an abundance of empirical evidence concerning the role of incomplete financial markets on 
educational attainment, in response to shocks. Some of these recent findings are provided – among 
the others – by Guarcello, Mealli e Rosati (2010), Fitzsimons (2007), Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti 
(2005), Dehejia and Gatti (2002), Edmonds (2002), Pörtner (2001), Ranjan (2001), Jacoby and 
Skoufias (1997), Jacoby (1994). 
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2.2.   The role of risk attitudes and time preferences 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the income stream, it is not surprising that risk attitudes and time 
preferences have played a key role in the theory of human capital accumulation.1
 
In practice, 
however, given the difficult job of measuring risk and time preferences, their impact on educational 
investments has attracted limited attention in the empirical literature and with ambiguous results.  
In some empirical models of human capital accumulation, a parameter of constant risk aversion has 
been included;2 however, such an approach does not allow variation in risk preferences across 
individuals to play a role in the investment decision-making process. Belzil and Hansen (2004), for 
example, estimate a dynamic programming model of schooling decisions where the degree of risk 
aversion is inferred from school decisions. In this model, individuals are assumed to be 
heterogeneous with respect to ability yet homogenous with respect to the degree of risk aversion.  
An important exception in the literature is Shaw (1996) who jointly models investments in risky 
human capital and financial wealth allowing for interpersonal differences in risk preferences.  
Among the others,3 these papers typically treat human capital accumulation as a standard 
investment process, predicting that the less risk averse individuals invest in relatively high levels of 
education. 
Differently from the previous works, Belzil and Hansen (2004) find that a counterfactual increase in 
risk aversion induces a precautionary accumulation of human capital. Gould, Moav, Weinberg 
(2001) find similar results. They analyze the impact of human capital depreciation risks on the 
choice of the type of education, asserting that in periods of technological progress, risk aversion 
induces workers to invest in general education to avoid the risk of losing their technology-specific 
skills. Their findings however do not control for any possible variation in this response due to 
capital markets conditions and to the source of expected risks. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Johnson (1978), Levhari and Weiss (1974), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Shaw (1996) and Palacios-
Huerta (2003). 
2
 Such studies include Brown and Rosen (1987), Moore (1995) and Murphy and Topel (1987). 
3
 Brown and Taylor (2005), Brunello (2002), Guiso and Paiella (2008), Belzil and Leonardi (2007) and Barsky et al. 
(1997) 
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2.3.   A new perspective: linking the two approaches 
 
While the role of risk attitudes, time preferences and capital market failures on school investments 
has been widely investigated especially in the theoretical literature, at our knowledge there is still 
no attempt to analyze their joint effect. 
This paper aims to fit this gap by exploring whether the lack of insurance and capital markets exerts 
heterogeneous effects on school investments, according to risks attitudes and time preferences. It is 
commonly thought that uninsured exposure to income risks induce parents to rely on internal assets 
(such as income from child labor) to secure a smoothed consumption path. This paper is intended to 
verify whether this occurs independently on risk attitudes and time preferences. Indeed, in case of 
preference for precautionary wealth accumulation (elicited by a positive third derivative of the 
utility function), parents with an uninsured exposure to income risks (due to the preclusion of 
borrowing and private insurance, for example) may desire to raise a precautionary demand for 
education in order to safeguard future consumption through higher returns from their children’s 
work. Instead, parents with access to capital markets can rely on borrowing or private insurance.  
 
3.  The model  
 
Our model is comprised of two periods, referred to 1 and 2. At the beginning of period 1, parents 
decide how to allocate their children’s unit time endowment between child labor cl  and human 
capital accumulation ( cl−1 ), where cl  represents the fraction of a child’s unit time endowment 
allocated to work.4 For simplicity, we assume that parents earn income A, in periods 1 and 2. We 
introduce uncertainty, by allowing parental income to include an absolutely continuous negative 
random variable Φ , with ( ) 0=ΦE  and ( ) 2var Φ=Φ σ . 
In period 2, each child supplies ( )clh −1  units of labor, where ( )⋅h  represents the human capital 
production function of the following form:5  
 
( ) ( ) βα κϑ cc llh −=− 11           (1) 
                                                 
4
 In the literature there is a tendency to narrow the discussion and analysis of the determinants of children’s activities to 
two non-leisure activities— market labor and schooling. There are a number of reasons why there has been a focus in 
the empirical literature on children market labor and schooling. First, both are important outcome variables that 
policymakers like to target. Second, it embeds the evidence that not only work “outside” home (i.e that for wage) 
should to be considered as “child labor”. In developing countries the time children do not spend at school is largely 
dedicated to work at home or in the family enterprise which can be as hard as work outside.  
5
 See, Trostel (2004), Ben-Porath (1967). 
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where 0, >βα  and 1<+ βα ; ( )cl−1  is the time spent at school, κ  represents the given amount 
of goods (i.e., the services from teachers, physical capital, etc.) invested in human capital, ϑ  is a 
productivity parameter (i.e., learning ability), α  and β  are returns elasticities. 
We normalize the returns to human capital to 1. Parents’ utility function is separable in period 1 and 
period 2 consumption ( 1pc  and 2pc , respectively) and is denoted by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2121 1
1
, ppppp cU
r
cUccW δ+
+
+=          (2) 
 
where ( )⋅U  is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave, r is the constant net return to 
financial assets and 10 << δ  is the discount factor with ( ) ( ) 111 <++ δr .6  
The interest in investigating the role of risk preferences on child time allocation motivates the 
adoption of an isoelastic utility function: ( ) ( ) ( )γγ −−= − 111ccu , with 1≥γ  as absolute coefficient of 
risk aversion and absolute coefficient of prudence.  
Parents can transfer income between periods by saving (denoted 0<b ) or borrowing (denoted 
0>b ). Capital markets are imperfect and some parents are prevented from borrowing. Borrowing 
restrictions are exogenously determined. 
The household maximization problem can be represented as, 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )21, 1
1
max ppls
cUrcU
c δ+
+
+           (3) 
 
subject to 
 
( ) Φ+−−+=
++=
blhAc
blAc
cp
cp
12
1
          (4) 
 
We have the following first order conditions, 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]Φ+−−+′+
+
=++′ blhAUErblAU cc 11
1
δ    0
* <= bb    (5) 
                                                 
6
 As in Carroll (2001), I assume that consumers are impatient, in the sense that if there were no uncertainty or liquidity 
constraints, they would choose to spend more than current income. For many people, particularly those close to 
subsistence in low developed countries, this assumption seems to be a natural one. 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]Φ+−+′+
+
>+′ cc lhAUE
rlAU 1
1
1
δ     0=b     (6) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )ccc lhblhAUE
rblAU −′Φ+−−+′
+
+
=++′ 11
1
1
δ       (7) 
 
0* >b  can be interpreted as the optimal amount of parental borrowing. If parents do not desire to 
borrow ( 0* ≤b ), then consumption always equals its optimal level; otherwise ( 0* >b ), 
consumption may be inefficiently low if borrowing is prevented. In this case households are 
considered as liquidity constrained. 
Using the first order conditions, the following conclusions can be established. 
Proposition 1. If borrowing is interior, then the laissez-faire level of child labor is efficient, i.e. 
( ) 11 =−′ clh . Hence, in absence of liquidity constraints, the allocation of children’s time does not 
depend either on goods and productivity parameters of the human capital production function or on 
expected income risks, even in presence of a possibly high coefficient of relative risk aversion 
( 0>γ ) [Result 1].  
Proposition 2. If borrowing is at corner, then ( ) 11 >−′ clh  and the laissez-level of child labor is 
inefficiently high [Result 2]. When capital markets are imperfect and parents cannot borrow, child 
labor supply is used to smooth the expected marginal utilities from consumption between period 1 
and period 2. As a consequence, the marginal investment in schooling may be inefficiently low. 
Considering the exact functional forms for the utility and the human capital production functions, 
eq. (7) with 0=b  becomes:  
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) βα
γ
κϑαδ
111
1
1
−
−
−=





+
Φ+−+
+
+
c
c
c l
lA
lhA
Er        (8) 
 
We take logs in eq. (8) and use the following hypotheses on the consumption growth distribution,  
 
tppp Iccc |lnlnln 212 ∆=− ∼ ( )2, ΦσµN   and  Φ=∆−∆=−∆ 222 lnlnln ppp cEcc µ    (9) 
 
with ( ) cc ll −−= βα κϑµ 1 , where first and second moments are conditioned to the set of 
information available at time 1, to get:7 
 
                                                 
7
 If a random variable X is distributed with a lognormal probability distribution function, then: 
lnE(X)=Eln(X)+1/2*var(ln(X)). 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )
22
2
1
1
1ln1ln1ln Φ+−+
+
=−−+ σγγµδααϑκ
β rlc       (10) 
 
where ( ) ( ) 01ln1 >−− clα  being ( ) 01 <−α  and ( ) 01ln <− cl . 
The first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (10) represent the determinist component of 
the marginal return to human capital investments, which decreases with the number of hours spent 
at school and with the coefficient of absolute risk aversion ( ) γ=1pcA . The last term on the right-
hand side measures the volatile component of the marginal return to human capital investments, 
which increases with the expected variability of future income ( 2Φσ ) and with the squared of the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion ( )( ) 221 γ=pcA . According to (10), in presence of liquidity 
constraints, the allocation of children’s time depends on expected income risks, on the degree of 
time preference ( 0>δ ) and on the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
Rearranging (10), we get: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
ββα αϑκσγδγκγϑα ln2
1
1
1ln11ln1 22 −+
+
+
=−−+−− Φ
rlll ccc     (11) 
 
Given the constancy of k,, βα  and ϑ , it is straightforward to notice that any increase in the right-
hand side of (11) implies a correspondent increase in the left-hand side of the same equation, which 
occurs at larger investments in early education (an increase in ( )tl−1 ). Hence, any increase of 
expected income risks implies an upward shift in the number of hours children spend at school. 
Moreover, at any increase of 2Φσ , the likely impact on educational investments is larger at 
increasing coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Indeed, if households were not risk averse ( 0=γ ), 
the time allocation response to 2Φσ  would be null; instead, a positive value of γ  requires a positive 
number of hours at school in order to restore the equilibrium. In other words, under liquidity 
constraints, risk averse households are characterized by a precautionary demand for education: 
education is thought a precautionary asset, an insurance device against expected income risks 
[Result 3].  
In a similar vein, it can be noticed that household’s impatience (defined by δ ) lowers the number 
of hours children spend at school [Result 4]. This last result suggests that households with a higher 
inter-temporal preference are more inclined to withdraw their children from schooling and to send 
them at work in order to feed up current consumption. 
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Finally, it is easy to notice that the time allocation response to expected income risks and parental 
preferences is lower at increasing child’s ability, α .  
Hence, in presence of liquidity constraints, household’s characteristics (such as risk attitudes, time 
preferences and subjective expectations of income risks) interact in shaping the optimal allocation 
of child time. Conversely, in absence of liquidity constraints, the allocation of children’s time is not 
affected by interactions between risk preferences and expected income risks. As a consequence, we 
can conclude that two human capital production functions exists: one for liquidity constrained 
households and another for non-constrained households.  
 
4.  Data 
 
We use data from the Indonesia Life Family Survey to verify our model’s predictions. 
The IFLS data have been largely used in the literature to study the likely effect of risks on child 
labor supply. This paper adds to and updates this literature by considering the most recent wave of 
the survey (the IFLS 4), fielded in 2007/2008.  
The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) is an on-going longitudinal survey in Indonesia, 
containing widespread current and retrospective information about adults, children and household’s 
assets. The sample is representative of about 83% of the Indonesian population and contains over 
30,000 individuals living in 13 of the 27 provinces in the country.  
The choice to use this dataset has been motivated by the extensive set of information provided. 
Indeed, the IFLS contains a wealth of information collected at the individual and household level, 
including multiple indicators of economic well-being (consumption, income, and assets); education, 
migration, and labor market outcomes; marriage, fertility, and contraceptive use; health status, use 
of health care, and health insurance; relationships among coresident and non-coresident family 
members; processes underlying household decision-making; transfers among family members and 
inter-generational mobility; and participation in community activities.  
Compared to the previous rounds of the survey, IFLS4 provides a new set of information on risk 
preferences and discount rate. In particular, and as it will be discussed below, the discount rate will 
be measured from hypothetical questions on whether the respondent prefers a lower amount of 
money now or a higher amount in one year. Risk preference coefficients will be extrapolated from 
hypothetical questions of a choice between a job that guarantees a certain amount of lifetime 
income, and another job that gives the individual a 50-50 chance of getting a higher or lower 
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amount than the previous one. Finally, since the waves of the IFLS span the period from several 
years before the economic crisis hit Indonesia to one year prior to the crisis as well as three years 
after the incident, extensive research can be carried out regarding the living conditions and coping 
mechanisms of Indonesian households during this tumultuous time period. 
Table 1 presents definitions and summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
The dependent variable is the number of school hours during the last week or the last week the 
school was in session during the school year of the survey, 2007-2008, for any child between 6 and 
17 years old (SCH_HOURS). This variable does not take into account past temporary interruptions to 
schooling, which are one way of dealing with contemporaneous shocks. Hence, it is plausible to 
assume that any income shock occurred until 2006 should not directly affect the number of hours 
children currently spend at school but rather to indirectly bear on it, by affecting the expectations of 
future earnings volatility as discussed below. 
 
4.1. Measuring income risks 
 
This paper uses past occurrence of shocks and the cross-sectional coefficient of variation of 
households income to proxy the risk profiles of the households.8 This approach is based on the 
assumption that households use past income volatility to predict future volatility, which we believe 
is a reasonable starting point. Ideally, we should measure the uninsured portion of the unanticipated 
components of income variability to obtain an accurate representation of the household’s exposure 
to risk. However, the last wave of IFLS does not contain accurate retrospective income information. 
To proxy the riskiness profile of income due to past macroeconomic shocks we employed a 
categorical variable MRISK. It runs from 0 to 2 representing the number of the following shocks the 
household faced between 2000 and 2006: flood, landslide, volcanic eruption, earthquake, tsunami, 
windstorm, forest fire, fire, civil strife.  
We also include a measure of idiosyncratic risks in parents’ job prospects, JRISK. It is a categorical 
variable from 0 to 7, standing for the number of years the household’s head experienced job 
termination (in the form of unemployment or inactivity) between 2000 and 2006. JRISK synthesizes 
                                                 
8
 See, among the others, Fitzsimons (2007) and Guiso et al. (1996). 
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the household’s head past difficulties to maintain a job, and its inclusion among the independent 
regressors of school hours estimates quantifies the likely impact of idiosyncratic riskiness in job 
prospect on educational investments. 
Following Guiso et al. (1996), we consider a further measure of income risks, such as the cross-
sectional coefficient of variation of households income (HINCM_CV) as proxy for the degree of 
overall income uncertainty. 
  
4.2. Measuring income shocks 
 
Similarly to uncertainty, we included two indicators for the occurrence of contemporaneous income 
shocks: MSHOCK and JSHOCK. MSHOCK is a proxy for recent macroeconomic income shocks. It is a 
categorical variable from 0 to 3, standing for the number of the following shocks the household has 
experienced since 2007: flood, landslide, volcanic eruption, earthquake, tsunami, windstorm, forest 
fire, fire, civil strife.  
Accordingly, JSHOCK is a categorical variable from 0 to 2, representing the number of years the 
household’s head experienced job termination (in the form of unemployment or inactivity) since 
2007. It is as a measure of recent idiosyncratic job shocks experienced by the household’s head and 
quantifies the troubles in maintaining a job.  
It might be objected that the school hours response to JRISK and MRISK may be the result of an ex-
post risk coping strategy to past persistent job termination events. Indeed, JRISK exhibits a relevant 
degree of path dependence.9 Exactly due to this persistence, the variable JSHOCK embeds past 
persistent income shocks in household’s head labor income households have not yet completely 
recovered from. Hence, any significant impact of JRISK on school hours is likely to measure the 
school hours response to any residual information embedded in JRISK which does not concern the 
current activity status of the household’s head. Therefore, the contemporaneous introduction of both 
JRISK and JSHOCK among the independent regressors of school hours equation contributes to 
disentangle the impact of JRISK - as a proxy of the riskiness of job prospects (out of any recent 
shock) - from that of JSHOCK as a proxy of contemporaneous or past persistent shocks in labor 
income. 
                                                 
9
 On average, across the whole period 2000-2008, the probability of the household’s head to not be employed in t, after 
having experienced a job termination in 1−t is over 50%. 
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With respect to MRISK, 98% and 96% of households who faced shocks on agricultural activities 
between 2000 and 2006 reported no loss in business and non-business assets, respectively, as a 
consequence of those events. Similarly, only 23% of households who faced macro shocks between 
2000 and 2006 declared its own house was heavily damaged by the disaster; and 89% of those 
households whose house was slightly or heavily damaged declared to have already rebuilt the house 
at the time of the survey. Hence, it is plausible to assume that the degree of shock persistence in the 
case of macro disaster is not significant and, as a consequence, MRISK reasonably represents a good 
proxy for the expected risk profile of households, even without the inclusion of MSHOCK among the 
regressors. Alongside MSHOCK, we introduce a further measure of income shocks caused by 
macroeconomic events, such as CROPLOSS. It is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the household 
reported at least one event of crop loss in the past 12 months, and 0 otherwise. 
  
4.3. Measuring time preference and risk aversion 
 
To measure parents’ degree of risk aversion, a categorical variable RISKPREF has been created. It 
takes value 1 if the household head is not risk averse, value 2 if the household head is moderately 
risk averse (MRISKAV), and value 3 if the household head is highly risk averse (HRISKAV). 
Household’s heads are considered as highly (moderately) risk averse if they declare to be more 
willing to accept a certain amount of rupias (which is lower in the case of moderately risk aversion) 
compared to playing a lottery in which there is a 50-50 probability to win significantly more or 
significantly less than the certain amount.  
 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
In particular, the household’s head is considered as highly risk averse if he/she answered 1 to at 
least one of the following hypothetical lotteries listed in table 2: SI03, SI04, SI05, SI13, SI14, SI15. 
The household’s head is considered as moderately risk averse if he/she answered 2 to at least one of 
the following hypothetical lotteries listed in table 2: SI13, SI14, SI15; and 1 to at least one of the 
following hypothetical lotteries listed in table 2: SI03, SI04, S015.  
Parents’ time preferences are captured by the dummy variable HHIMPATIENCE, taking value 1 if the 
household’s head declares to be more focused on the well-being in the presence and the immediate 
future, and 0 otherwise. In particular, each household is classified as time impatient if the 
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household’s head is more willing to accept a 1 million of rupias today, rather than waiting 1 year to 
get an amount which is significantly higher. 
On the bases of the hypothetical lotteries shown in table 2, the household’s head is considered as 
time impatient if he/she answered 1 to at least one of the following hypothetical lotteries listed in 
table 2: SI21B, SI21C, SI21D. 
 
4.4. Measuring liquidity constraints 
 
A household is defined as liquidity constrained (LIQCON) if at least one of the following conditions 
applies: i) the household’s head and/or his/her spouse tried to borrow money from non-family 
members or friends over the past 12 months but the number of household reported loans is null, ii) 
if the household head and/or his/her spouse turned down in his/her efforts to secure a loan from 
non-family members or friends during the past 12 months, iii) if the household head and/or his/her 
spouse was not successful in securing a loan from non-family members or friends in the past 12 
months, iv) nobody in the household declares to know a place where borrowing money from non-
family members or friends. 
By adopting this approach, 12.1% of all the children between 6 and 17 years old are found to belong 
to liquidity constrained households in 2007.  
 
5.  Theoretical hypotheses testing 
 
Using the dataset discussed above, the model results outlined in paragraph 3 will be tested along the 
following lines.  
[Hp.1] – The “Result 2”, according to which, ceteris paribus, the presence of liquidity constraints 
decreases the time children spend at school, will be tested through the significance of a two-sample 
mean comparison test of the variable SCH_HOURS between liquidity constrained and non-
constrained households.  
[Hp.2] – Interactions between the proxy variables for expected income risks (JRISK, MRISK, 
HINCM_CV) and the variables for risk attitudes discussed above (RISKPREF: MRISKAV, HRISKAV) may 
be used to verify whether, among liquidity constrained households, the presence of exogenous 
income risks positively affects the number of hours children spend at school at increasing positive 
degree of parents’ risk aversion (“Result 3”). For example, the significance of the of the interactions 
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between RISKPREF and MRISK on the amount of time children spend at school will test whether there 
is a precautionary demand for education due to income risks from macroeconomic shocks. 
Similarly, interactions between the variables RISKPREF and JRISK will test whether there is a 
precautionary demand for education due to idiosyncratic risks in parents’ job prospects. Finally, 
interactions between HINCM_CV and RISKPREF will test whether households’ perception of overall 
income uncertainty positively affects child schooling at increasing parents’ risk aversion for 
children living in liquidity constrained households. If households are not liquidity constrained, these 
interactions should not significantly affect the outcome variable SCH_HOURS since, according to our 
theoretical findings, child labor is not used as an ex-ante risk coping strategy.  
[Hp.3] – A negative and significant impact of HHIMPATIENCE on schooling hours will verify the 
“Result 4”, according to which, in presence of liquidity constraints, a positive degree of impatience 
exerts a downgrading effect on school hours. 
[Hp.4] – To control for the possibility that the likely response of child labor to risks depends 
positively on the degree of household’s wealth, we include two further interactions terms: 
WEALTHPC×MSHOCK×RISKPREF and WEALTHPC×JSHOCK×RISKPREF. WEALTHPC is the constructed 
index of household wealth10 in three quintile categories. The relevance of their coefficients on the 
school hours regression estimates allows us to investigate whether the response of school hours to 
the interactions between uncertainty and risk attitudes are sensible to marginal changes in 
household’s wealth (i.e. whether the evidence of a precautionary motive for education is prevalent 
among wealthier households). 
[Hp.5] – Finally, we also included interactions between the three measures of recent idiosyncratic 
and macroeconomic income shocks (JSHOCK, MSHOCK, CROPLOSS) and RISKPREF on the regression 
equation of school hours. Any significant difference between the coefficients of the interaction 
variables JSHOCK×RISKPREF (or MSHOCK×RISKPREF) and those of the interaction variables 
JRISK×RISKPREF (or MRISK×RISKPREF) might help to understand whether household’s responses in 
terms of educational investments differ according to the timing of shock occurrence. In this paper, 
we argue that, for liquidity constrained households, expected income risks give rise to a 
precautionary demand for education (positive signs for the interaction variables JRISK×RISKPREF or 
MRISK×RISKPREF on school hours regressions). Conversely, the contemporaneous occurrence of 
                                                 
10
 The Wealth Index is a composite measure of the cumulative living standard of a household, calculated using easy-to-
collect data on a household’s ownership of selected assets, such as televisions and bicycles, materials used for housing 
construction, and types of water access, sanitation facilities, jewelry and savings. Generated with a statistical procedure 
known as principal components analysis, the Wealth Index places individual households on a continuous scale of 
relative wealth. 
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adverse income shocks negatively affect the amount of hours children spend at school, with child 
labor acting as an initial buffer against those shocks (negative signs for the interaction variables 
JSHOCK×RISKPREF, MSHOCK×RISKPREF or CROPLOSS×RISKPREF on school hours regressions). 
However, if households are not liquidity constrained, these interactions should not significantly 
affect the outcome variable SCH_HOURS since, according to our theoretical findings, child labor is 
not used as a risk coping strategy.  
 
6.  The Empirical Strategy 
 
This section discusses the empirical strategy used in the proceeding of the paper to verify the 
hypotheses listed in the previous paragraph. Detailed materials of the econometric model are 
provided in the Appendix. 
Researchers are usually left to compare investments in early education among liquidity constrained 
households and non-liquidity constrained households. However, the problem of endogeneity 
(Hausman 1978) of liquidity constraints arises due to the fact that households who invest less in 
education are more likely to be those who face credit constraints. Because the overall circumstances 
responsible for differing initial conditions of constrained and unconstrained households are known 
only to the household and not to the researcher, these cannot be directly controlled to single out the 
pure effect of liquidity constraints on schooling. For instance, if ability is at least partly inheritable, 
less able children are more likely to belong to liquidity constrained households and, ceteris paribus, 
to invest less in education. Then, failure to control for this correlation will yield an estimated 
liquidity constraints effect on schooling that is biased down. In addition, a problem of sample 
selection also arises due to the fact that the dependent variable (the number of weekly hours at 
school) is observed only for a restricted non-random sample. For example, we observe the time at 
school of a child living in a liquidity constrained household only if the household the child belongs 
to is liquidity constrained and the child is enrolled in school. Conversely, one observes the time at 
school of a child living in a non-liquidity constrained household only if the household the child 
belongs to is not liquidity constrained and the child is enrolled in school. If the samples of liquidity 
constrained households and of children at school were random draws from the population, a tobit 
regression of school hours could be fitted, by including credit status as a right-hand-side variable 
and pooling the entire sample. However, this approach becomes problematic if children in liquidity 
constrained and non-constrained households differ systematically in the expected amount of school 
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hours not only because of a merely intercept effect but also because of a slope effect. This occurs 
for example when the returns to different observable attributes vary by credit regime or if the 
subsample of students is non-randomly selected.11 In other words, estimating a tobit model where 
non-students are simply treated as zeros may be problematic, as it assumes that the decision to be 
enrolled in school is qualitatively the same as the decision related to the degree of enrolment in 
terms of the amount of time spent at school. However, there may be important differences related to 
these decisions. Consider for example the effect of age: the older the child is, the more likely it is 
that she is involved in some form of market or non-market work, thereby subtracting time to school. 
Secondly, children at school may differ from children not at school with respect to unobserved 
characteristics, such as ability. Hence, treating the decision to abstain from school as a corner 
solution may provide biased results due to a possible correlation of the error terms. As a 
consequence, studying the determinants of the amount of children’s time at school needs to account 
for the presence of children who are not enrolled in school at all and to correct for the possible 
sample selection. 
A common means of “correcting” for both the endogeneity and sample selection biases associated 
with systematic differences between groups is to impose a specific probability distribution structure 
on the model which explicitly incorporates the selection rule(s). That is the modeling strategy 
adopted here. We follow Barham and Boucher (1998) in extending the specification of Heckman 
(1976, 1979) to include two selection criteria before running the school hours regression equations: 
a rule for credit regime affiliation (first-stage probit) and a rule for the school enrolment decision 
(second-stage probit).  
To account for the possible presence of sample selection biases discussed above, we choose to split 
up the whole sample into two subsamples: one including children living in liquidity constrained 
households (denoted by C) and the other including children living in non-liquidity constrained 
households (denoted by U). 
To proceed we estimate the probit for credit regime affiliation first for the whole sample and then 
generate the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) term for each sub-sample (IMRU1, IMRC1). These terms 
will then be included in the probit equation explaining enrolment status for each subsample. The 
appropriate IMR terms from these equations (IMRU2, IMRC2) will then be included in the two final 
schooling hours equations (one for each subsample, Amemiya 1985).  
                                                 
11
 This is indeed the case in many developing and under-developed countries where school enrolment rates are very 
low. 
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6.1. Identification issues 
 
As in any model, one must be aware from where identification arises.  
The identification approach adopted in this paper relies on Heckman’s procedure and sample 
splitting. From the credit selection equation on the whole sample, the appropriate IMR terms are 
generated for each credit regime. Then, we opted for splitting up the sample into children living in 
liquidity constrained households and children living in households with access to capital markets. 
The IMR terms obtained in the first probit will be included in a second probit equation explaining 
the school enrolment status for each subsample. The appropriate IMR terms from these equations 
will then be included in the final SCH_HOURS equation of each credit regime. 
Identification in the second-stage probit is provided by the presence of an exclusion restriction, the 
variable GIV_HASSIST, in the credit regime selection rule and by the nonlinearity of the IMR term 
obtained in the first-stage probit (Heckman, 1978; Wilde, 2000). GIV_HASSIST is a categorical 
variable, representing the number of times the household has provided help in the form of money, 
goods, services to persons outside the household (other than biological parents, siblings, children) 
or to other parties (for example like a foundation/organization, friends, and relatives) during the last 
12 months (except gifts, souvenirs, etc.). The use of this variable as exclusion restriction is based on 
the assumption that parents care more about their children’s wellbeing than about the wellbeing of 
friends or relatives outside the household. Hence, the amount of assistance received is supposed to 
be positively correlated with school enrolment as it represents a sets of goods and services 
households members do not longer need to get from child work. Instead, the amount of assistance 
provided to friends or other relatives is supposed not to affect school enrolment, as parents are 
thought to assign priorities to their children’s wellbeing. Conversely, both of them should be 
significantly and inversely correlated with the likelihood for households to be liquidity constrained, 
since, ceteris paribus, it is reasonable to suppose that better off households are more likely to 
provide assistance to non-family members.  
To assess the validity of this identification strategy, we ran an instrumental variable probit of the 
probability to be enrolled at school including LIQCONS among the relevant regressors and 
GIV_HASSIST as instrument for LIQCONS. The Wald test signals a non-rejection of the null hypothesis 
of exogeneity of LIQCONS in the school enrolment probit. Hence, in principle, the equation of school 
enrolment would be identified also in absence of any exclusion restriction. Similarly, we performed 
an instrumental variable regression of SCH_HOURS including LIQCONS among the relevant regressors 
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and GIV_HASSIST as instrument for LIQCONS. The underidentification and weak identification tests 
conclude in favor of the hypothesis that the model is identified and the excluded instruments are 
relevant. 
Because the IMR terms are nonlinear functions of the variables included in the probit models, then 
the SCH_HOURS regression equations are identified because of this nonlinearity. Since the 
nonlinearity of the IMR terms arises from the assumption of normality in the probit models, we 
tested this normality assumption in the school enrolment selection equation for each credit regime. 
Lagrange multiplier tests conclude that the normality of residuals cannot be rejected for both credit 
regimes. 
The analysis of the inter-quartile ranges of residuals helps us to evaluate whether our double 
selection model is fairly specified. The inter-quartile range assumes the symmetry of the 
distribution. Severe outliers consist of those points that are either 3 inter-quartile-ranges below the 
first quartile or 3 inter-quartile-ranges above the third quartile. The presence of any severe outliers 
should be sufficient evidence to reject normality at a 5% significance level. Mild outliers are 
common in samples of any size. In our estimates of school hours, we don’t have any severe outliers 
and the distributions seem fairly symmetric. The residuals have an approximately normal 
distribution, thereby suggesting that our school hours estimates are well specified. 
All details are available from the authors under request. 
 
7. Estimation Results 
 
This section presents and discusses regression results.  
The dependent variable SCH_HOURS is the number of school hours during the last week or the last 
week the school was in session during the school year of the survey, 2007-2008 for any child 
between 6 and 17 years old.  
Sample statistics indicate that this variable differs in mean and variance between liquidity 
constrained and non-constrained households. The mean value of SCH_HOURS is 17.8 for the sample 
of children living within non-liquidity constrained households and drops to 16.6 for the sample of 
children living within liquidity constrained households. The correspondent standard deviations are 
12.3 and 12.2, respectively.    
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The t-test for sub-samples with unequal variances shows that the mean of SCH_HOURS significantly 
differs between the two groups. The null hypothesis of equality between the two sample means is 
rejected at a 1% significance level against both the alternative hypotheses.  
The same results are obtained from the Hotelling’s T2 test. These findings suggest that school hours 
are significantly related to the credit regime, thereby confirming [Hp.1]. 
Results from the double selection models (outlined in section 6.1) complete the overall 
understanding of the effects of liquidity constraints on school investments.  
 
7.1. Credit regime selection rule 
 
The maximum likelihood estimation of the probability of households to be liquidity constrained is 
presented in Table 3.  
 
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
Goodness of fit measures indicate that the estimated model fits the data reasonably well. The Wald 
test showed that the parameter estimates were significantly different from zero. The model correctly 
predicts the overall probability of households to fall into the true credit regime for 88% of the 
sample.  
The results show that the coefficients of most of the variables hypothesized to influence the 
likelihood for children to belong to liquidity constrained households have the expected signs.  
Among the traditional human capital and employment characteristics of the household’s head and 
his/her spouse, a high educational attainment (measured by a level of qualification above upper 
secondary education) seems to significantly lower the probability for children to live in liquidity 
constrained households (by between -4.3% and -9.2%). Among household demographic 
characteristics, larger numbers of household members and of children positively effect the outcome. 
Ceteris paribus, the probability for children to belong to liquidity constrained households is 
significantly larger in rural areas (+3.8%). 
Alongside education, household wealth seems the most relevant determinant for the credit regime 
affiliation. In particular, at increasing household wealth (measured by the quintiles of household 
wealth index) the probability for children to belong to liquidity constrained households decreases.  
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The household’s head activity status also matters: when she is employed in a dependent job, the 
probability of positive liquidity constraints significantly drops. The variable chosen as exclusion 
restriction, GIV_HASSIST, is significantly and inversely related to the likelihood for children to live 
in a households with liquidity constraints. 
 
7.2. School enrolment selection rule  
 
The maximum likelihood estimations of the probability of children to be enrolled in school are 
presented in Table 4. 
 
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
 
Goodness of fit measures indicate that the estimated models fit the data reasonably well. In both 
models, the Wald test showed that the parameter estimates were significantly different from zero. 
The models correctly predicts the overall probability of households to fall into the true credit regime 
for more than 90% of the sample.  
The results show that the coefficients of most of the variables hypothesized to influence the 
likelihood for children to be enrolled in school have the expected signs and are substantially similar 
across credit regimes.  
Ceteris paribus, the probability for children between 6 and 17 years old to go to school lowers with 
age (-2.9% for the constrained sample and -1.8% for the non-constrained sample) and increases 
with the educational attainment of the household’s head. 
There is a strong evidence of persistence in child’s time use: being at school during the previous 
school year significantly increases the likelihood to be still enrolled in school by 61% for the 
sample of children living in liquidity constrained households, and by 52% for the sample of children 
not living in liquidity constrained households. The degree of persistence in child’s time use also 
matters: any additional year spent in education increases the likelihood of being currently at school 
by between 1.7% and 2.4%.  
The inverse Mills ratio (IMR1) of the credit regime selection rule exerts a significant effect only for 
the unconstrained sample, with a negative coefficient of -7.7%. This suggests the presence of 
unobserved variables which increase the probability of selection into the unconstrained credit 
regime and the probability of a lower than average score in the probability of school enrolment.  
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7.3. Regression estimates on school hours 
 
The regression estimates on the amount of school hours for children between 6 and 17 years old are 
presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
TABLES 4 AND 5 AROUND HERE 
 
We included seven model specifications for the determinants of school hours in order to investigate 
step by step the role of risk attitudes and time preferences on child time allocation. 
The results for the sample of children within liquidity constrained households show that risk 
attitudes, time preferences and shocks are not individually significant. Overall, unobserved 
characteristics affecting the likelihood of being liquidity constrained are inversely related to school 
hours, suggesting that the average SCH_HOURS of children living in liquidity constrained households 
is lower than the average potential SCH_HOURS. When risks and shocks are jointly considered 
(models 5 and 6), JSHOCK and JRISK exert significantly impacts on SCH_HOURS (which are, 
respectively, negative and positive). The substantial difference between the impacts of JRISK and 
JSHOCK confirms that their contemporaneous consideration within the same regression is sufficient 
to capture the distinct roles they exert on SCH_HOURS. JRISK is a proxy for household’s expectations 
of income risks and, in turn, affects the dependent variable as a potential ex-ante risk-coping 
strategy; JSHOCK is a proxy for household’s unexpected income shocks and affects the dependent 
variable as a potential ex-post risk coping strategy.  
In order to further investigate the appropriateness of the distinction between JRISK and JSHOCK and 
between MRISK and MSHOCK, we carried out a further specification by including the overall 
measures of parental job-related uncertainty (as the sum of JRISK and JSHOCK) and of macro 
uncertainty (as the sum of MRISK and MSHOCK). Regression results of model 7 suggest that it is 
indeed the case. The impact of the variable JRISK+JSHOCK is now not significantly different from 
zero, pooling the observed opposite effects of JRISK and of JSHOCK evidenced by model 6 results. 
Hence, the sole introduction of JRISK+JSHOCK as a compound measure of household’s uncertainty in 
income sources may be misleading as it embeds two distinct components of income uncertainty: 
one referred to expected job-related risks and the other referred to unexpected job-related shocks. 
Differently from what found in the school enrolment equation, the number of times the household 
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has received help in the form of money, goods or services from persons outside the household or 
from other parties during the past 12 months (REC_HASSIST) is significantly and positively related to 
the amount of school hours. 
Differently from the previous estimation results, our findings for the sample of children living in 
non liquidity constrained households show that, across all the specification models, path 
dependence in child time allocation (SCH_PREV_YEAR and YEARS_SCHOOL) and selectivity 
correction factors (IMRU1, IMRU2) represent the most relevant determinants of school investments.  
In model specification 2, time preferences and risk attitudes appear significant: household’s head 
impatience exerts a positive effect on the dependent variable, while risk aversion induces parents to 
invest less in early education. Moving to models 3 to 5, it can be noticed that JRISK and JSHOCK are 
the only proxies for income uncertainty to be significantly related to the outcome (with a positive 
and negative coefficient, respectively). As in the constrained sample, regression results of model 7 
suggest that the distinction between JRISK and JSHOCK is appropriate as the non significant (and 
almost null) impact of the variable JRISK+JSHOCK pools the significant opposite effects of JRISK and 
JSHOCK evidenced by models 5 and 6. Hence, again, the sole introduction of JRISK+JSHOCK as a 
compound measure of household’s uncertainty in income sources may be misleading as it embeds 
two distinct components of income uncertainty: one referred to expected job-related risks and the 
other referred to unexpected job-related shocks. 
To verify model’s hypotheses [Hp.2] and [Hp.5], we add interaction terms between our measures of 
macro and idiosyncratic risks and shocks to model 6 specification. Results are presented in Table 6.  
 
TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
 
Goodness of fit measures indicate that the estimated models fit the data reasonably well: the R-
squared statistics for the constrained and unconstrained sample are 0.29 and 0.20 respectively. 
The significance of the coefficients of correlation between the selection equations and the 
school investment function (IMR1 and IMR2) indicates that sample selections effectively occur. 
The regression estimate on school hours for children living in liquidity constrained households 
shows that, after controlling for the sample selection and endogeneity issues (through the 
introduction of the inverse Mills ratios, IMR1 and IMR2, among the regressors), demographic 
characteristics are no longer highly significant compared to measures of income uncertainty, risk 
attitudes and time preferences.  
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In absence of risks and shocks, household’s head risk aversion reduces the number of school hours 
(as shown by the negative coefficients of HRISKAV and MRISKAV).  
When parents are not risk averse, any macroeconomic shock affecting land crops increases the 
predicted number of school hours by 4 (that is, 25.968-21.533). This effect decreases by over 1 hour 
when parents are risk averse (that is, -12.931+11.707). This result is apparently odd. However, it 
can be reasonably thought that, after adverse events on agricultural business, less time and efforts in 
harvest activities is required. Moreover, in absence of risk aversion, job related risks and shocks 
(JRISK, JSHOCK) exert no significant impact, while a one point increase in the uncertainty of 
household income (HINCM_CV) reduces the predicted number of weekly school hours by 22. 
The picture relevantly changes for risk averse households. First of all, job-related shocks (JSHOCK) 
turn out to significantly lower school hours for children whose household’s head is risk averse. 
Hence, our [Hp.5] is verified and child labor acts as an initial buffer against those shocks. 
Moreover, when parents are risk averse, job-related risks (JRISK) and overall income uncertainty 
(HINCM_CV) significantly increase the number of hours children spend at school. An inverse-U-
shaped relationship can be observed between the dependent variable and the degree of household’s 
head risk aversion. Hence, [Hp.2] is verified especially for children whose household’s head is 
characterized by a moderate degree of risk aversion.  
The significance of the coefficient of the interactions between the variables RISKPREF and JRISK (or 
HINCM_CV) on school investments confirms that uncertainty in job prospects or overall income 
positively affect child schooling at increasing degree of parents’ risk aversion for children living in 
liquidity constrained households. This result verifies [Hp.2], by suggesting the presence of a 
precautionary demand for education from income risks.  
Household’s head impatience does not seem to significantly affect school investments (thereby not 
verifying [Hp.3] predictions). Moreover, interactions between wealth, risk aversion and income 
uncertainty show that the school hours response to the interactions between income uncertainty and 
risk attitudes is sensible to marginal changes in household wealth and the precautionary demand for 
education is prevalent among wealthier households (thereby, confirming [Hp.4]). 
The regression results on school hours for children living in non-liquidity constrained households 
differ substantially from those obtained for liquidity constrained households. After controlling for 
sample selection and endogeneity issues (through the significant impacts of the inverse Mills ratios, 
IMRU1 and IMRU2, among the regressors), child’s individual and household characteristics not 
related to risk preferences remain the sole relevant determinants of the number of school hours. 
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Indeed, contrarily to the constrained sample, our proxies for path dependence in child’s time use 
represent the most relevant determinants of school investments. Being at school during the previous 
school year as well as any additional year spent in education in the past significantly increase the 
current number of school hours. Interactions between our measures of risks and risk attitudes are 
not significantly related to the dependent variable, suggesting that there is no evidence of a 
precautionary demand for education arisen from risk aversion. This result confirms our model’s 
prediction according to which a precautionary demand for education typically arises as a 
consequence of liquidity constraints and parents’ risk aversion [Hp.2]. Similarly, interactions 
between our measures of shocks and risk attitudes do not exert any significant role, thereby 
confirming that child labor is used as an ex-post risk coping strategy by risk averse households only 
when borrowing possibilities are precluded ([Hp.5]).  
Ceteris paribus, macro risks and shocks are not significant determinants of school investments. 
Instead, in absence of risk aversion, the occurrence of adverse idiosyncratic income shocks 
(JSHOCK) and uncertainty in job prospects (JRISK) seem to significantly affect the number of school 
hours (with negative and positive coefficients, respectively). Finally, time preference – measured by 
the degree of household’s head time impatience – exert a positive impact on school investments by 
increasing the number of school hours. 
 
7.4.   Oaxaca decomposition  
 
In this section, we employ the Neuman-Oaxaca decomposition (2002) to decompose the effect of 
credit regime on the number of school hours into fourth terms. The first one represents differences 
attributable to explanatory variables (explained component); the second term represents behavioral 
differences (unexplained component); the third and fourth terms can be thought of as the differences 
due to, respectively, observed and unobserved self-selection into credit regime and school 
enrolment. Details of the econometric specification can be found in Appendix. 
Results from Oaxaca’s decomposition are reported in table 7. 
 
TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
 
In this application, gap in endowments and coefficients account for the great bulk of the gap in 
outcomes. The first ones are mostly driven by the between-samples differences in the selectivity 
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correction factors. In particular, the between sample differences due to observed self-selection into 
the credit regime (school enrolment) is significantly negative (positive) suggesting that for the 
sample of children living in liquidity constrained households there is a significantly higher (lower) 
correlation between unobserved variables of the school enrolment (credit regime) selection rule and 
those of the school hours regression estimates. Gap in coefficients are mostly due to between-
groups differences in the returns to past investments in education (SCH_PREV_YEAR) and to the 
interactions between risk attitudes and risk measures. 
As support of our previous findings and model predictions, the between-groups differences in the 
coefficients of the variables MRISKAV×JRISK, HRISKAV×JRISK and MRISKAV×HINCM_CV, 
HRISKAV×HINCM_CV are significantly negative. This result confirms that job-related risks and 
overall income uncertainty increase school investments of risk averse parents who are liquidity 
constrained to a larger extent. This between-groups gap is more pronounced at increasing degree of 
risk aversion.  
The significant positive difference in the coefficients of MRISKAV×JSHOCK and HRISKAV×JSHOCK 
between the two subsamples suggests that the occurrence of adverse idiosyncratic income shocks 
seems to exert a larger negative effect on the school hours of the disadvantaged sample.  
Overall, these results are coherent with our previous findings that the phenomenon of a 
precautionary demand for education is more relevant among liquidity constrained households. At 
the same time, the reduction in school investments as an ex-post risk coping strategy is 
predominantly used by risk averse parents who are liquidity constrained.  
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
Using the Indonesia Life Family Survey dataset, this paper has shown that the determinants of child 
time allocation decisions significantly differ according to households’ borrowing possibilities. 
Though this evidence has been widely explored in the literature, this paper adds that the presence of 
liquidity constraints affects the joint impact of risk attitudes, income risks and shocks on schooling 
investments. When households are liquidity constrained, the weekly amount of hours children spend 
at school is found to be positively related to the interactions between risk attitudes and expected 
income risks.  
This result suggests that a precautionary demand for education typically arises as a consequence of 
both liquidity constraints and risk aversion. When borrowing is precluded, risk averse parents are 
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found to invest in schooling as a substitute for the optimal amount of precautionary savings so to 
insure future consumption through higher returns from their children’s work. At the same time, our 
results point out that the lack of market insurance mechanisms against the contemporaneous 
realizations of adverse income shocks induces risk averse parents to underinvest in schooling and to 
increase the time children spend at work as an ex-post risk coping strategy. 
No precautionary demand for education has been found in the face of expected macroeconomic 
risks, suggesting that the prospect of community-level risks is sufficient to trigger no ex-ante and 
ex-post risk coping strategy based on child time allocation.  
Our results are supported by Belzil and Hansen (2004) and Gould, Moav, Weinberg (2001) who 
find that a counterfactual increase in risk aversion increases educational attainment as a safeguard 
strategy. Their findings however do not control for any possible variation in this response due to 
capital markets conditions and to the source of expected risks. 
The role of riskiness in human capital investments deserves further research. 
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Tables in the text 
 
Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
  
Child and Household’s Demographic Characteristics 
SCH_HOURS Number of hours any child between 6 and 17 years old the child was at school during the last 
week (or the last week the school was in session) within the school year, 2007-2008. 
AT_SCHOOL Dummy variable equal to 1 if any child between 6 and 17 years old is enrolled at school and 0 
otherwise 
SCH_PREV_YEAR Dummy variable equal to 1 if any child between 6 and 17 years old was enrolled at school 
during the year prior to the survey and 0 otherwise 
YEARS_SCHOOL Number of years at school 
CHEDUC Highest level of education attended by any child between 6 and 17 years old. It takes value 0 
for “no education” (reference), 1 for “elementary school” (ELEMENTARY), 2 for “junior high 
educational level” (JUNIOR_HIGH). 
GRADE Categorical variable taking value from 0 to 7, standing for the class completed at the highest 
level of education. 
AGE Age in years of the child any child between 6 and 17 years old was enrolled at school prior to 
the survey 
MALE Dummy variable equal to 1 if any child between 6 and 17 years old is male and 0 otherwise 
NCHILD Number of children below 18 years old in the household 
HSIZE Number of household’s members 
PROVINCE Categorical variable for the province of residence 
RURAL Dummy variable taking value 1 if the area of household’s residence is rural and 0 if it is urban 
  
Time and Risk Preferences Characteristics 
HHIMPATIENCE Dummy variable proxy for the degree of time preference, taking value 1 if the household’s head 
declared to be more focused on the well-being in the presence and the immediate future, and 0 
otherwise. In particular, households are classified as time impatience if the household’s head is 
more willing to accept a 1 million of rupias today, rather than waiting 1 or 5 years to get an 
amount which is significantly higher. 
RISKPREF Categorical variable for the degree of household’s head risk aversion. It takes value 1 if the 
household’s head is not risk averse, value 2 if the household’s head is moderately risk averse 
(MRISKAV), and value 3 if the household’s head is highly risk averse (HRISKAV).  
RISKAV Compound dummy variable which takes value 2 if RISKPREF is larger than 1 and 1 otherwise. 
  
Shocks and uncertainty 
MRISK Categorical variable from 0 to 3 representing the number of the following shocks the household 
experienced between 2000 and 2006: flood, landslide, volcanic eruption, earthquake, tsunami, 
windstorm, forest fire, fire, civil strife 
MSHOCK Categorical variable from 0 to 2 representing the number of the following shocks the household 
experienced since 2007: flood, landslide, volcanic eruption, earthquake, tsunami, windstorm, 
forest fire, fire, civil strife.  
CROPLOSS Dummy variable taking value 1 if the household has experienced at least one event of crop loss 
in the past 12 months, and 0 otherwise. 
JRISK Categorical variable from 0 to 7 which represents the number of years the household’s head 
experienced job termination between 2000 and 2006. 
JSHOCK Categorical variable from 0 to 2 which represents the number of years the household’s head 
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experienced job termination since 2007. 
HINCM_CV Coefficient of income variation across households 
  
Household’s Wealth 
LIQCONS Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is liquidity constrained and 0 otherwise. Any 
household is classified as liquidity constrained if at least one of the following conditions 
applies: i) the household’s head and/or his/her spouse tried to borrow money from non-family 
members or friends over the past 12 months but the number of household’s reported loans is 
null, or ii) if the household’s head and/or his/her spouse turned down in his/her efforts to secure 
a loan from non-family members or friends during the past 12 months, or iii) if the household’s 
head and/or his/her spouse was not successful in securing a loan from non-family members or 
friends in the past 12 months, or iv) nobody in the household declare to know a place where 
borrowing money from non-family members or friends. 
WEALTHINDEX Continuous variable, proxy for the household’s wealth. 
WEALTHPC Categorical variable, constructed by taking 3 quintile categories of the variable WEALTHINDEX. 
  
Activity and Employment Status of Household’s Head and Spouse 
HHEDUC Categorical variables for the educational attainment of household’s head, taking values 0 for 
“no education” (reference), 1 for “elementary education” (HHEDUC1), 2 for “secondary or 
tertiary education” (HHEDUC2), and 3 for “other type of education” (es. Religious, HHEDUC3). 
SPEDUC Categorical variables for the educational attainment of the spouse of household’s head, taking 
values 0 for “no education” (SPEDUC0), 1 for “elementary education” (SPEDUC1), 2 for 
“secondary, tertiary or religious education” (SPEDUC2). 
HHACT, SPACT Categorical variables for the activity status of household’s head and his/her spouse, 
respectively, taking values 0 for “non-employed” (reference, HHNOTEMPLOYED, 
SPNOTEMPLOYED), 1 for “dependent employment” (HHDEPENDENT, SPDEPENDENT), 2 for “self-
employment” (HHSELFEMPLOYED, SPSELFEMPLOYED), and 3 for “casual work” 
(HHCASUALWORK, SPCASUALWORK). 
ADEMPL Number of adult household’s members who are employed  
  
Transfers 
REC_HASSIST Number of times the household has received help in the form of money, goods, services from 
persons outside the household (other than biological parents, siblings, children) or from other 
parties (for example like a foundation/organization, friends, and relatives) during the last 12 
months (except gifts, souvenirs, etc.). 
GIV_HASSIST Number of times the household has provided help in the form of money, goods, services to 
persons outside the household (other than biological parents, siblings, children) or to other 
parties (for example like a foundation/organization, friends, and relatives) during the last 12 
months (except gifts, souvenirs, etc.). 
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Table 2: The hypothetical lottery for measuring risk and time preferences  
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Table 3: Credit regime and school enrolment selection equations (marginal effects) 
 
PROB(LIQ_CONS>0) PR(AT_SCHOOL>0) PR(AT_SCHOOL>0) 
 
 LIQ_CONS=1 LIQ_CONS=0 
WEALTHPC1 Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) 
WEALTHPC2 -0.035*** 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.004) 
WEALTHPC3 -0.038*** 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.005) 
HSIZE 0.003*** -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
NUMCHILD 0.015*** -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) 
ADEMPLOYED -0.002 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) 
HHEDUC0 Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) 
HHEDUC1 -0.043*** 0.032 -0.007 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.008) 
HHEDUC2 -0.089*** 0.033 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.031) (0.010) 
HHEDUC3 -0.092*** 0.036*** -0.016 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) 
NO SPOUSE Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) 
SPEDUC0 0.022 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.006) 
SPEDUC1 -0.008 -0.011 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.005) 
SPEDUC2 -0.045*** 0.018 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.005) 
HHNOTEMPLOYED Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) 
HHDEPENDENT -0.033* -0.017 -0.007 
 (0.017) (0.050) (0.012) 
HHSELFEMPLOYED 0.017* -0.036 0.007** 
 (0.010) (0.026) (0.003) 
HHCASUALWORK 0.013 0.011 0.012*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.004) 
SPNOTEMPL/NOSPOUSE Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) 
SPDEPENDENT -0.014 -0.129 -0.006 
 (0.040) (0.303) (0.021) 
SPSELFEMPLOYED 0.003 -0.142** 0.004 
 (0.018) (0.071) (0.006) 
SPCASUALWORK -0.011 0.019 -0.010 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.008) 
URBAN Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) 
RURAL 0.038*** -0.010 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.004) 
REC_HASSIST 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 35 
 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
GIV_HASSIST -0.020***   
 (0.004)   
AGE  -0.029*** -0.018*** 
  (0.006) (0.002) 
FEMALE Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) 
MALE  -0.001 -0.004 
  (0.012) (0.003) 
SCH_PREV_YEAR  0.607*** 0.523*** 
  (0.057) (0.028) 
YEARS_SCHOOL  0.024*** 0.017*** 
  (0.007) (0.002) 
IMR1  -0.059 -0.077*** 
  (0.078) (0.027) 
OBSERVATIONS 7,405 902 6,503 
PSEUDO R2 0.123 0.517 0.519 
 
Additional controls: province of residence. 
Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
 
 
Table 4: School hours regression equation for different model specifications for children within 
liquidity constrained households 
 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 
SCH_HOURS LIQ_CONS=1 LIQ_CONS=1 LIQ_CONS=1 LIQ_CONS=1 LIQ_CONS=1 LIQ_CONS=1 LIQ_CONS=1 
AGE 0.528 0.562 0.389 0.472 0.362 0.404 0.589 
 (0.497) (0.498) (0.503) (0.504) (0.504) (0.502) (0.497) 
FEMALE Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
MALE 1.131 1.232 1.210 1.135 1.132 1.226 1.201 
 (0.750) (0.751) (0.757) (0.751) (0.754) (0.755) (0.752) 
NUMCHILD -0.626 -0.814 -0.506 -0.781 -0.706 -0.855 -0.758 
 (0.541) (0.551) (0.555) (0.553) (0.563) (0.567) (0.556) 
HSIZE 0.059 0.055 0.063 0.057 0.088 0.081 0.051 
 (0.125) (0.127) (0.128) (0.131) (0.135) (0.137) (0.126) 
NO EDUCATION Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
ELEMENTARY -3.420 -4.611 -0.815 -2.889 3.694 2.079 -4.122 
 (14.553) (14.623) (13.314) (14.418) (13.186) (13.152) (14.654) 
JUNIOR_HIGH 1.145 0.517 8.244 1.007 9.257* 8.214 0.798 
 (8.320) (8.389) (5.483) (8.180) (5.442) (5.437) (8.431) 
GRADE 0.674 0.765 1.545 0.527 0.912 1.015 0.741 
 (1.471) (1.476) (1.484) (1.458) (1.463) (1.461) (1.475) 
SCH_PREV_YEAR -7.129* -7.042* -6.755* -7.135* -7.282* -7.228** -7.061* 
 (3.834) (3.694) (3.914) (3.819) (3.803) (3.660) (3.662) 
YEARS_SCHOOL -0.196 -0.298 -0.970 0.031 -0.207 -0.324 -0.295 
 (1.566) (1.569) (1.585) (1.560) (1.570) (1.566) (1.572) 
WEALTHPC1 Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
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WEALTHPC2 2.006 1.894 1.946 2.262* 2.330* 2.111 1.819 
 (1.259) (1.244) (1.298) (1.270) (1.305) (1.291) (1.255) 
WEALTHPC3 2.599* 2.354* 2.286* 2.730** 2.582* 2.304* 2.390* 
 (1.328) (1.331) (1.346) (1.342) (1.352) (1.350) (1.333) 
HHNOTEMPLOYED Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HHDEPENDENT 1.761 1.477 1.714 1.646 1.600 1.591 1.799 
 (2.977) (2.861) (2.987) (2.977) (2.945) (2.824) (2.880) 
HHSELFEMPLOYED 2.034* 1.777 2.434** 1.624 2.229* 2.167* 2.088* 
 (1.095) (1.119) (1.155) (1.149) (1.160) (1.170) (1.176) 
HHCASUALWORK -2.390* -2.501* -2.148 -2.735** -2.501* -2.411* -2.247* 
 (1.335) (1.309) (1.412) (1.361) (1.406) (1.376) (1.355) 
SPNOTEMPL/NOSP Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
SPDEPENDENT 1.844 3.439 2.534 1.515 1.998 4.192 4.222 
 (7.413) (6.796) (7.826) (7.448) (7.534) (6.699) (6.815) 
SPSELFEMPLOYED 6.012** 6.326** 6.312** 5.683** 5.919** 6.425** 6.397** 
 (2.556) (2.617) (2.476) (2.596) (2.449) (2.504) (2.604) 
SPCASUALWORK 0.631 0.900 1.067 0.400 0.309 0.579 0.829 
 (1.469) (1.451) (1.482) (1.465) (1.471) (1.446) (1.450) 
HHEDUC0 Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HHEDUC1 1.730 1.983 2.130 1.895 2.044 2.233 1.936 
 (1.594) (1.603) (1.610) (1.616) (1.624) (1.627) (1.596) 
HHEDUC2 5.394** 5.692** 5.897** 5.781** 5.894** 6.114** 5.622** 
 (2.627) (2.616) (2.662) (2.669) (2.699) (2.682) (2.613) 
HHEDUC3 8.741** 8.939** 9.129** 8.921** 8.506* 8.833* 9.072** 
 (4.425) (4.359) (4.626) (4.443) (4.638) (4.548) (4.363) 
NO SPOUSE Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
SPEDUC0 -4.121*** -4.192*** -4.372*** -4.258*** -3.677** -3.620** -4.001** 
 (1.549) (1.560) (1.594) (1.563) (1.596) (1.599) (1.576) 
SPEDUC1 -0.825 -0.950 -0.926 -1.083 -0.629 -0.543 -0.720 
 (1.096) (1.094) (1.142) (1.107) (1.149) (1.132) (1.102) 
SPEDUC2 0.970 0.781 0.838 1.020 1.272 1.250 0.899 
 (1.720) (1.709) (1.755) (1.727) (1.764) (1.751) (1.709) 
URBAN Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
RURAL -1.033 -0.899 -1.813 -1.347 -2.363* -2.137 -0.867 
 (1.274) (1.269) (1.336) (1.287) (1.330) (1.327) (1.282) 
REC_HASSIST 0.546*** 0.563*** 0.567*** 0.533*** 0.562*** 0.583*** 0.573*** 
 (0.206) (0.208) (0.206) (0.205) (0.204) (0.207) (0.209) 
IMRC1 -8.782* -8.726* -8.668* -9.729** -9.166* -8.895* -8.413* 
 (4.877) (4.838) (4.931) (4.948) (5.003) (4.947) (4.857) 
IMRC2 -9.362* -9.165* -8.736* -9.238* -9.108* -8.945* -9.186* 
 (5.284) (5.052) (5.304) (5.271) (5.127) (4.871) (4.982) 
HHPATIENCE  Ref      Ref   Ref   
  (.)    (.) (.) 
HHIMPATIENCE  2.697**    3.495** 3.161** 
  (1.314)    (1.425) (1.408) 
NO RISKAV  Ref      Ref   Ref   
  (.)    (.) (.) 
HRISKAV  -1.868*    -1.464 -1.625 
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  (1.113)    (1.148) (1.127) 
MRISKAV  -3.293*    -2.831 -3.066 
  (1.933)    (1.971) (1.946) 
NO RISKS/SHOCKS   Ref    Ref   Ref   Ref   
   (.)  (.) (.) (.) 
MRISK   -1.755  -2.440 -2.416  
   (2.188)  (2.215) (2.188)  
MRISK+MSHOCK       -0.399 
       (1.688) 
JRISK+JSHOCK       0.140 
       (0.148) 
MSHOCK    1.072 0.972 1.367  
    (2.903) (2.951) (2.900)  
CROPLOSS     0.989 1.104 0.533  
    (3.367) (3.419) (3.361)  
JSHOCK    -0.590 -2.811*** -2.586***  
    (0.539) (0.912) (0.922)  
JRISK   0.029  0.662** 0.728***  
   (0.172)  (0.272) (0.273)  
HINCM_CV   -0.957  -1.618 -1.653  
   (1.856)  (1.884) (1.917)  
CONSTANT 32.930** 33.178** 30.568* 34.333** 27.562* 26.575* 31.154* 
 (16.767) (16.794) (15.995) (16.689) (15.920) (15.868) (17.015) 
OBSERVATIONS 784 784 746 784 746 746 784 
R-SQUARED 0.227 0.233 0.238 0.230 0.251 0.259 0.234 
 
Additional controls: province of residence. 
Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
 
Table 5: School hours regression equation for different model specifications for children within 
liquidity non-constrained households 
 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 
SCH_HOURS LIQ_CONS=0 LIQ_CONS=0 LIQ_CONS=0 LIQ_CONS=0 LIQ_CONS=0 LIQ_CONS=0 LIQ_CONS=0 
AGE -0.262 -0.260 -0.231 -0.301* -0.293* -0.291* -0.265 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.177) (0.174) (0.176) (0.176) (0.174) 
FEMALE Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
MALE -0.092 -0.086 -0.063 -0.074 -0.056 -0.051 -0.082 
 (0.273) (0.273) (0.276) (0.272) (0.275) (0.275) (0.273) 
NUMCHILD 0.157 0.147 0.134 0.042 0.021 0.017 0.136 
 (0.200) (0.200) (0.202) (0.200) (0.201) (0.201) (0.200) 
HSIZE -0.104* -0.101* -0.085 -0.071 -0.032 -0.029 -0.097* 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) 
NO EDUCATION Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
ELEMENTARY -0.597 -0.559 -0.749 -0.918 -1.385 -1.454 -0.633 
 (3.189) (3.188) (3.191) (3.154) (3.096) (3.093) (3.186) 
JUNIOR_HIGH 1.283 1.325 1.207 1.150 0.752 0.733 1.298 
 (2.154) (2.157) (2.151) (2.158) (2.105) (2.106) (2.161) 
GRADE 0.609 0.610 0.617 0.629 0.626 0.636* 0.618 
 38 
 
 (0.389) (0.389) (0.391) (0.386) (0.385) (0.384) (0.388) 
SCH_PREV_YEAR 4.332*** 4.344*** 3.941*** 4.338*** 3.930*** 3.935*** 4.340*** 
 (1.189) (1.187) (1.180) (1.190) (1.164) (1.159) (1.186) 
YEARS_SCHOOL 1.014** 1.013** 0.966** 1.026** 1.008** 0.999** 1.009** 
 (0.413) (0.413) (0.416) (0.410) (0.408) (0.408) (0.413) 
WEALTHPC1 Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
WEALTHPC2 -0.186 -0.198 -0.200 -0.171 -0.134 -0.150 -0.202 
 (0.377) (0.378) (0.381) (0.377) (0.379) (0.379) (0.378) 
WEALTHPC3 -0.606 -0.588 -0.548 -0.590 -0.431 -0.423 -0.596 
 (0.411) (0.411) (0.415) (0.411) (0.413) (0.413) (0.411) 
HHNOTEMPLOYED Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HHDEPENDENT -1.043 -1.081 -0.995 -1.345 -1.176 -1.202 -1.129 
 (0.874) (0.876) (0.878) (0.874) (0.865) (0.867) (0.878) 
HHSELFEMPLOYED -0.150 -0.215 -0.152 -0.564 -0.425 -0.483 -0.280 
 (0.382) (0.383) (0.389) (0.389) (0.388) (0.389) (0.390) 
HHCASUALWORK 1.037* 1.029* 1.044* 0.638 0.781 0.772 0.963* 
 (0.558) (0.560) (0.566) (0.562) (0.563) (0.564) (0.565) 
SPNOTEMPL/NOSP Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
SPDEPENDENT -0.420 -0.331 -0.351 -0.278 -0.360 -0.297 -0.300 
 (1.799) (1.820) (1.803) (1.788) (1.751) (1.769) (1.819) 
SPSELFEMPLOYED 0.986 1.028 0.963 0.967 0.964 0.968 1.010 
 (0.697) (0.695) (0.697) (0.700) (0.695) (0.693) (0.696) 
SPCASUALWORK 0.499 0.501 0.510 0.507 0.460 0.452 0.500 
 (0.596) (0.596) (0.597) (0.589) (0.590) (0.591) (0.596) 
HHEDUC0 Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
HHEDUC1 0.565 0.610 0.491 0.581 0.315 0.390 0.635 
 (0.699) (0.701) (0.709) (0.698) (0.710) (0.713) (0.703) 
HHEDUC2 1.807** 1.789** 1.810** 1.777** 1.611* 1.613* 1.800** 
 (0.844) (0.846) (0.854) (0.843) (0.856) (0.860) (0.847) 
HHEDUC3 3.185*** 3.136*** 3.162*** 3.094*** 3.105*** 3.062*** 3.118*** 
 (1.014) (1.016) (1.026) (1.014) (1.028) (1.031) (1.016) 
NO SPOUSE Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
SPEDUC0 -1.011 -1.012 -0.827 -1.357* -0.799 -0.814 -1.102 
 (0.700) (0.701) (0.718) (0.702) (0.716) (0.718) (0.709) 
SPEDUC1 -0.176 -0.231 0.001 -0.510 0.121 0.051 -0.320 
 (0.445) (0.446) (0.468) (0.451) (0.468) (0.470) (0.459) 
SPEDUC2 0.446 0.398 0.593 0.155 0.711 0.645 0.317 
 (0.479) (0.479) (0.497) (0.483) (0.497) (0.498) (0.488) 
URBAN Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   Ref   
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
RURAL -0.871** -0.868** -0.945*** -0.917*** -0.978*** -0.976*** -0.869** 
 (0.349) (0.349) (0.356) (0.350) (0.355) (0.354) (0.349) 
REC_HASSIST 0.344*** 0.335*** 0.345*** 0.321*** 0.341*** 0.334*** 0.332*** 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
IMRU1 3.973 3.953 4.382* 4.468* 4.688* 4.666* 4.049 
 (2.630) (2.632) (2.653) (2.631) (2.643) (2.645) (2.635) 
IMRU2 4.895*** 4.906*** 4.281*** 4.894*** 4.282*** 4.288*** 4.902*** 
 (1.582) (1.582) (1.565) (1.587) (1.546) (1.543) (1.581) 
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HHPATIENCE  Ref      Ref   Ref   
  (.)    (.) (.) 
HHIMPATIENCE  0.970**    0.716 0.826* 
  (0.412)    (0.452) (0.445) 
NO RISKAV  Ref      Ref   Ref   
  (.)    (.) (.) 
HRISKAV  -0.889**    -1.041*** -0.982** 
  (0.373)    (0.386) (0.384) 
MRISKAV  -0.347    -0.416 -0.445 
  (0.520)    (0.528) (0.528) 
NO RISKS/SHOCKS   Ref    Ref   Ref   Ref   
   (.)  (.) (.) (.) 
MRISK   -0.113  -0.425 -0.359  
   (0.824)  (0.839) (0.841)  
MRISK+MSHOCK       0.125 
       (0.482) 
JRISK+JSHOCK       -0.050 
       (0.056) 
MSHOCK    -0.276 -0.398 -0.386  
    (0.749) (0.758) (0.761)  
CROPLOSS     0.838 0.884 0.923  
    (1.005) (1.021) (1.023)  
JSHOCK    -1.036*** -2.670*** -2.684***  
    (0.201) (0.321) (0.324)  
JRISK   0.014  0.600*** 0.591***  
   (0.064)  (0.097) (0.098)  
HINCM_CV   0.014  -0.003 -0.026  
   (0.702)  (0.702) (0.703)  
CONSTANT 14.285*** 14.090*** 14.326*** 15.536*** 15.419*** 15.627*** 14.509*** 
 (4.030) (4.043) (4.059) (4.008) (3.979) (4.009) (4.065) 
OBSERVATIONS 5,870 5,870 5,713 5,870 5,713 5,713 5,870 
R-SQUARED 0.180 0.181 0.181 0.184 0.192 0.193 0.181 
 
Additional controls: province of residence. 
Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
 
Table 6: School hours regression equation 
 
 
MODEL 8 MODEL 8 
SCH_HOURS LIQ_CONS=0 LIQ_CONS=1 
AGE -0.289* 0.644 
 (0.176) (0.516) 
FEMALE Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
MALE -0.053 1.251* 
 (0.275) (0.752) 
NUMCHILD 0.026 -1.116* 
 (0.202) (0.575) 
HSIZE -0.029 0.186 
 (0.057) (0.159) 
HHPATIENCE Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
HHIMPATIENCE 0.880* 2.672* 
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 (0.500) (1.600) 
NO RISKAV Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
HRISKAV -1.073** -1.924 
 (0.461) (1.419) 
MRISKAV -0.434 -3.885* 
 (0.621) (2.293) 
NO RISKS/SHOCKS Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
MRISK -1.172 15.102** 
 (3.674) (6.382) 
MSHOCK -2.507 -21.533* 
 (2.847) (11.028) 
CROPLOSS  -0.488 25.968** 
 (4.217) (13.191) 
JRISK 0.570** -1.020 
 (0.269) (1.077) 
JSHOCK -2.329** 2.488 
 (0.931) (3.820) 
HINCM_CV -1.268 -22.216*** 
 (1.762) (6.232) 
RISKAVXMRISK 0.743 -9.084 
 (2.023) (5.560) 
RISKAVXMSHOCK 1.216 11.707* 
 (1.614) (6.197) 
RISKAVXCROPLOSS 0.781 -12.931* 
 (2.328) (7.453) 
MRISKAVXJRISK -0.292 2.933* 
 (0.405) (1.517) 
HRISKAVXJRISK 0.114 2.309** 
 (0.313) (1.133) 
MRISKAVXJSHOCK -0.192 -10.203** 
 (1.292) (4.655) 
HRISKAVXJSHOCK -0.538 -5.217 
 (0.995) (3.935) 
MRISKAVXHINCM_CV 2.102 32.280*** 
 (2.304) (7.790) 
HRISKAVXHINCM_CV 0.025 15.346** 
 (2.188) (6.850) 
RISKAVXMRISKXWEALTHPC2 0.153 -1.203 
 (1.092) (3.199) 
RISKAVXMRISKXWEALTHPC3 -0.692 0.807 
 (0.944) (3.569) 
HRISKAVXJRISKXWEALTHPC2 -0.282 -0.389 
 (0.197) (0.485) 
HRISKAVXJRISKXWEALTHPC3 0.101 -0.946* 
 (0.208) (0.515) 
HRISKAVXHINCM_CVXWEALTHPC2 2.544 9.638** 
 (2.101) (4.765) 
HRISKAVXHINCM_CVXWEALTHPC3 1.496 7.943* 
 (1.868) (4.164) 
NO LEVEL OF EDUC. COMPLETED Ref. Ref.  
 (.) (.) 
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ELEMENTARY -1.455 2.534 
 (3.110) (13.124) 
JUNIOR_HIGH 0.752 7.600 
 (2.111) (5.485) 
GRADE 0.639* 0.826 
 (0.386) (1.452) 
SCH_PREV_YEAR 3.941*** -9.510** 
 (1.173) (3.702) 
YEARS_SCHOOL 0.992** -0.327 
 (0.410) (1.564) 
WEALTHPC1 Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
WEALTHPC2 -0.116 2.237 
 (0.405) (1.369) 
WEALTHPC3 -0.455 2.183 
 (0.438) (1.416) 
HHNOTEMPLOYED Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
HHDEPENDENT -1.177 1.029 
 (0.869) (2.872) 
HHSELFEMPLOYED -0.473 2.044* 
 (0.391) (1.194) 
HHCASUALWORK 0.740 -2.813** 
 (0.564) (1.393) 
SPNOTEMPL/NOSPOUSE Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
SPDEPENDENT -0.424 6.520 
 (1.765) (9.164) 
SPSELFEMPLOYED 0.981 6.247** 
 (0.701) (2.515) 
SPCASUALWORK 0.459 0.426 
 (0.591) (1.502) 
HHEDUC0 Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
HHEDUC1 0.397 2.401 
 (0.717) (1.681) 
HHEDUC2 1.596* 5.995** 
 (0.864) (2.722) 
HHEDUC3 3.006*** 7.788* 
 (1.036) (4.665) 
NO SPOUSE Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
SPEDUC0 -0.850 -3.458** 
 (0.726) (1.663) 
SPEDUC1 -0.042 -0.602 
 (0.478) (1.165) 
SPEDUC2 0.567 1.610 
 (0.505) (1.771) 
URBAN Ref  Ref  
 (.) (.) 
RURAL -0.969*** -1.454 
 (0.356) (1.333) 
IMR1 4.503* -7.989 
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 (2.654) (4.979) 
IMR2 4.310*** -11.970** 
 (1.560) (4.892) 
REC_HASSIST 0.337*** 0.647*** 
 (0.069) (0.212) 
CONSTANT 15.523*** 26.234 
 (4.036) (15.984) 
OBSERVATIONS 5,713 746 
R-SQUARED 0.195 0.289 
 
Additional controls: province of residence, rural area. 
Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
 
Table 7: Oaxaca decomposition 
 
ENDOWMENTS COEFFICIENTS INTERACTION 
DIFFERENCE -8.358*** 7.316*** 1.830 
 (2.885) (1.981) (3.471) 
OBSERVED SELECTION CREDIT REGIME -6.735***   
 (2.374)   
UNBSERVED SELECTION CREDIT REGIME  1.021 -0.883 
  (3.638) (3.147) 
OBSERVED SELECTION SCHOOL ENROLMENT 0.350**   
 (0.171)   
UNOBSERVED SELECTION SCHOOL ENROLMENT  2.103*** -0.429** 
  (0.614) (0.201) 
AGE -0.056 -12.365** 0.062 
 (0.105) (4.987) (0.118) 
MALE -0.002 -0.811* 0.002 
 (0.031) (0.429) (0.031) 
NUMCHILD 0.101 1.285 -0.149 
 (0.117) (1.071) (0.127) 
HSIZE -0.361** -3.449*** 0.414*** 
 (0.143) (1.190) (0.156) 
HHIMPATIENCE -0.050 -1.264 0.024 
 (0.048) (1.515) (0.034) 
MRISKAV -0.223** 0.299** 0.207* 
 (0.109) (0.152) (0.111) 
HRISKAV 0.097 0.258 -0.015 
 (0.073) (1.133) (0.066) 
MRISK -0.056 -0.493 0.062 
 (0.099) (0.493) (0.108) 
MSHOCK -0.134 1.419 0.132 
 (0.238) (1.416) (0.237) 
CROP_LOSS -0.114 -1.249 0.115 
 (0.217) (1.187) (0.219) 
JRISK 0.287 2.677*** -0.389 
 (0.209) (1.029) (0.256) 
JSHOCK -0.142 -2.805** 0.231 
 (0.153) (1.288) (0.215) 
HINCM_CV -0.129 1.296** 0.124 
 (0.214) (0.511) (0.206) 
RISKAVXMRISK 0.081 0.615 -0.087 
 (0.126) (0.534) (0.135) 
RISKAVXMSHOCK 0.134 -1.407 -0.135 
 (0.235) (1.324) (0.238) 
RISKAVXCROPLOSS 0.074 1.106 -0.079 
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 (0.181) (1.107) (0.191) 
MRISKAVXJRISK 0.016 -0.168* -0.019 
 (0.060) (0.090) (0.072) 
HRISKAVXJRISK -0.387* -1.877*** 0.410* 
 (0.228) (0.641) (0.242) 
MRISKAVXJSHOCK -0.084 0.177* 0.094 
 (0.072) (0.098) (0.079) 
HRISKAVXJSHOCK 0.275 1.726** -0.271 
 (0.195) (0.809) (0.197) 
MRISKAVXHINCM 0.078 -0.164* -0.073 
 (0.088) (0.092) (0.083) 
HRISKAVXHINCM -0.070 -0.844* 0.070 
 (0.149) (0.450) (0.150) 
RISKAVXMRISKXWEALTHPC2 0.001 0.011 -0.005 
 (0.038) (0.091) (0.041) 
RISKAVXMRISKXWEALTHPC3 0.021 -0.044 -0.023 
 (0.035) (0.066) (0.038) 
HRISKAVXJRISKXWEALTHPC2 0.019 0.066 -0.014 
 (0.028) (0.118) (0.027) 
HRISKAVXJRISKXWEALTHPC3 0.011 0.144 -0.015 
 (0.028) (0.094) (0.035) 
HRISKAVXHINCM_CVXWEALTHPC2 0.050 -0.070 -0.039 
 (0.045) (0.059) (0.041) 
HRISKAVXHINCM_CVXWEALTHPC3 -0.036 -0.112 0.029 
 (0.043) (0.100) (0.039) 
ELEMENTARY -0.490 -12.489 0.532 
 (0.623) (14.052) (0.643) 
JUNIOR_HIGH 0.488 -2.667 -0.460 
 (0.433) (2.157) (0.431) 
GRADE 0.000 1.519 0.000 
 (0.009) (4.319) (0.040) 
SCH_PREV_YEAR -0.015 13.739*** 0.019 
 (0.129) (3.782) (0.164) 
YEARS_SCHOOL -0.024 3.528 0.172 
 (0.286) (6.077) (0.307) 
WEALTHPC2 -0.051 0.322 0.064 
 (0.067) (0.346) (0.072) 
WEALTHPC3 -0.024 0.390 0.021 
 (0.033) (0.393) (0.030) 
HHDEPENDENT -0.021 0.037 0.015 
 (0.026) (0.058) (0.025) 
HHSELFEMPLOYED -0.185** -0.906*** 0.185** 
 (0.083) (0.284) (0.085) 
HHCASUALWORK 0.018 0.261** -0.022 
 (0.030) (0.128) (0.037) 
SPDEPENDENT 0.014 -0.018 -0.014 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.027) 
SPSELFEMPLOYED 0.042 -0.170* -0.035 
 (0.046) (0.088) (0.040) 
SPCASUALWORK -0.006 0.016 -0.003 
 (0.025) (0.132) (0.026) 
HHEDUC_1 0.064 0.418 -0.111 
 (0.204) (0.867) (0.231) 
HHEDUC_2 0.022 0.432 0.201 
 (0.238) (0.564) (0.263) 
HHEDUC_3 -0.181 0.151 0.457* 
 (0.261) (0.096) (0.275) 
SPEDUC_1 0.083 0.163 -0.076 
 (0.078) (0.179) (0.086) 
SPEDUC_2 0.192 0.676 -0.146 
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 (0.131) (0.631) (0.139) 
SPEDUC_3 -0.381 0.673* 0.468* 
 (0.244) (0.370) (0.259) 
RURAL -0.399** -1.489** 0.383** 
 (0.183) (0.726) (0.191) 
REC_HASSIST 0.018 0.264 0.031 
 (0.045) (0.392) (0.048) 
OBSERVATIONS 6,459 6,459 6,459 
 (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
 
Annex 
 
Annex A1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
CHILD AND HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
SCH_HOURS 6670 19.564 11.372 1 40 
AT_SCHOOL 7405 0.901 0.299 0 1 
SCH_PREV_YEAR 7405 0.838 0.369 0 1 
YEARS_SCHOOL 7405 3.494 2.241 0 9 
ELEMENTARY 7405 0.728 0.445 0 1 
JUNIOR_HIGH 7405 0.197 0.398 0 1 
GRADE 6895 2.788 1.884 0 7 
AGE 7405 9.758 2.584 6 17 
MALE 7405 0.517 0.500 0 1 
NUMCHILD2 7405 1.686 0.802 1 5 
HSIZE 7405 6.724 3.003 1 39 
PROVINCE 7405 34.779 16.240 12 76 
RURAL 7405 0.506 0.500 0 1 
TIME PREFERENCES AND RISK ATTITUDES  
HHIMPATIENCE 7405 0.834 0.372 0 1 
MRISKAV 7405 0.097 0.296 0 1 
HRISKAV 7405 0.690 0.462 0 1 
RISKAV 7405 1.787 0.409 1 2 
SHOCKS AND UNCERTAINTY  
MRISK 7405 0.043 0.216 0 2 
MSHOCK 7405 0.088 0.309 0 3 
CROPLOSS 7405 0.056 0.230 0 1 
JRISK 7405 1.241 2.518 0 7 
JSHOCK 7405 0.436 0.741 0 2 
HINCM_CV 7193 0.053 0.203 0 1.809 
WEALTH 
LIQ_CONS 7405 0.122 0.327 0 1 
WEALTHINDEX 7405 0.450 0.906 -6.095 3.323 
WEALTHPC1 7405 0.334 0.472 0 1 
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WEALTHPC2 7405 0.332 0.471 0 1 
WEALTHPC3 7405 0.334 0.472 0 1 
EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PARENTS 
HHEDUC 7405 2.527 0.758 1 4 
SPEDUC 7405 1.998 1.039 0 3 
HHNOTEMPLOYED 7405 0.722 0.448 0 1 
HHDEPENDENT 7405 0.026 0.159 0 1 
HHSELFEMPLOYED 7405 0.187 0.390 0 1 
HHCASUALWRK 7405 0.066 0.248 0 1 
SPNOTEMPLOYED 7405 0.895 0.306 0 1 
SPDEPENDENT 7405 0.007 0.081 0 1 
SPSELFEMPLOYED 7405 0.038 0.191 0 1 
SPCASUALWORK 7405 0.060 0.238 0 1 
ADEMPLOYED 7405 1.268 0.982 0 7 
TRANSFERS 
GIV_HASSIST 7405 0.984 1.287 0 12 
REC_HASSIST 7405 1.965 2.313 0 22 
 
 
Annex A.2. The econometric model 
 
The model is specified as follows: 
 
*
1 1 1 1i i iy u′= +x β ; credit regime affiliation rule      (A1) 
*
2 2 2 2i i iy u′= +x β ; school enrolment selection rule     (A2) 
3 3 3 3 3i i iy uσ′= +x β ; hours at school       (A3) 
 
 
Let our dependent variable, namely the number of hours the i-th child spent at school during the last 
week or the last week the school was in session, be identified by 3iy . The response iy  of the ith 
individual from a random sample { }nN ,....,1=  is assumed to depend on a 1×K  vector of 
explanatory variables (including the constant term), 3ix , with β  representing the related 1×K  
vector of parameters to be estimated. 3σ  is an unknown scale parameter, and the miu ’s (with m 
from 1 to 3) are the unobserved terms with zero means and the following correlation matrix: 
 
12 13
12 23
13 23
1
1
1
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
 
 Σ =  
  
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The selection variables, *1iy  and 
*
2iy , representing the likelihoods for a child to belong to a liquidity 
constrained household and to be enrolled in school respectively, are not observed. Only their signs 
are observed, i.e. whether or not a child belongs to a liquidity constrained household and whether or 
not she is enrolled in school. Thus, the variances of the unobserved terms in the selection equations 
cannot be estimated and are set to one. The binary variables 1D  and 2D  are the observed outcomes 
of the selection rules and allow classification of the sample following: 
 
*
1
1 *
1
1  if  0
0  if  0
y
D
y
 >
= 
≤
          (A4) 
 
*
2
2 *
2
1  if  0
0  if  0
y
D
y
 >
= 
≤
          (A5) 
  
As a result of the two selection rules, four possible outcomes can occur: 1. ( )1 21, 1D D= = , living in 
a liquidity constrained household and being enrolled in school; 2. ( )1 21, 0D D= = , living in a 
liquidity constrained household and not being enrolled in school; 3. ( )1 20, 1D D= = , not living in a 
liquidity constrained household and being enrolled in school; 4. ( )1 20, 0D D= = , not living in a 
liquidity constrained household and not being enrolled in school. 
To account for the possible presence of sample selection biases (discussed above), we choose to 
split up the whole sample into two sub-sample: one including children living in liquidity 
constrained households (denoted by C) and the other including children living in non-liquidity 
constrained households (denoted by U). 
To proceed we estimate the probit for credit regime affiliation first for the whole sample and then 
generate the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) term for each sub-sample. These terms will then be 
included in the probit equation explaining enrolment status for each sub-sample. The appropriate 
IMR terms from these equations would then be included in the two final schooling hours equations 
for each subsample (Amemiya 1985). Hence, formally, for each subsample, we would end up with 
only three observed (out of four) outcomes. For the liquidity constrained sample: 1. ( )1 21, 1D D= = , 
living in a liquidity constrained household and being enrolled in school; 2. ( )1 21, 0D D= = , living 
in a liquidity constrained household and not being enrolled in school; 3. ( )1 0D = , not living in a 
liquidity constrained household. For the liquidity unconstrained sample: 1 ( )1 20, 1D D= = , not 
living in a liquidity constrained household and being enrolled in school; 2. ( )1 20, 0D D= = , not 
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living in a liquidity constrained household and not being enrolled in school; 3. ( )1 1D = , living in a 
liquidity constrained household. 
With this structure, the regression function for the equation of interest for each subsample is: 
 
( ) ( )3 3 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 2| , , | , ,i i i i iE y D D E u D Dσ′= +x x β x       (A6) 
 
If ( )3 3 1 2| , , 0i iE u D D ≠x , then a linear regression of 3iy  on 3ix  will result in biased parameter 
estimates. In order to generate unbiased estimates of the elements of 3β , additional information 
regarding the conditional distribution of the unobserved term, 3iu , is required. The additional 
structure imposed here is the form of the joint distribution of the three unobserved terms. Assume 
( )1 2 3,i i iu u u ~ ( )0,N Σ , independent of the observation of the covariates. For a same individual, 
however, the unobserved terms may be correlated. 
For the liquidity constrained subsample, school hours are observed only when 0*1 >iy  and 0
*
2 >iy . 
Then, for this subsample, the conditional expectation of 3iy  is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )22211133332133 ,|,,| βxβxβxx iiiicicccicici uuuEDDyE ′−>′−>+′= σ    (A7) 
 
The multivariate normal structure allows the derivation of an expression for the conditional 
expectation of the disturbance, iu3 : 
 
( ) cccciiiici uuuE 2231132221113 ,| λρλρ +=′−>′−> βxβx       (A8) 
 
where the two cλ  terms are the analogues to the selection inverse Mill’s ratio. With these results, 
the conditional expectation in (A7) becomes: 
 
( ) ( ) ccccccicici DDyE 2211332133 ,,| λθλθ ++′= βxx        (A9) 
 
where ,1331
ccc ρσθ =  and, ccc 2332 ρσθ = . 
Similarly, for the liquidity unconstrained subsample, school hours are observed only when 0*1 ≤iy  
and 0*2 >iy . Then, for this subsample, the conditional expectation of 3iy  is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )22211133332133 ,|,,| βxβxβxx iiiiuiuuuiuiui uuuEDDyE ′−>′>+′= σ     (A10) 
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The multivariate normal structure allows the derivation of an expression for the conditional 
expectation of the disturbance, iu3 : 
 
( ) uuuuiiiiui uuuE 2231132221113 ,| λρλρ +−=′−>′> βxβx       (A11) 
 
where the two uλ  terms are the analogues to the selection inverse Mill’s ratio, with 
( ) ( )22222 βxβx iiu ′Φ′= ϕλ , and ( ) ( )11111 1 βxβx iiu ′Φ−′= ϕλ . With these results, the conditional 
expectation in (19) becomes: 
 
( ) ( ) ucuuuuiuiui DDyE 2211332133 ,,| λθλθ ++′= βxx        (A12) 
 
where ,1331
uuu ρσθ −=  and, uuu 2332 ρσθ = . 
The estimation is conducted in two steps. First, data on the outcomes of the two selecting rules are 
used to obtain the likelihood function for the bivariate probit. Letting ( )⋅G  denote the standard 
normal cumulative distribution functions, this likelihood function is: 
(A13) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∏∏∏∏
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
−
′
−
′⋅′−′−⋅′′⋅−′′−=
0
1
122211
0
0
122211
1
1
122211
1
0
122211
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
;,;,;,;,
D
D
ii
D
D
ii
D
D
ii
D
D
ii FFFFL ρρρρ βxβxβxβxβxβxβxβx   
 
The first term of the likelihood function corresponds to children living in non-liquidity constrained 
households who are enrolled in school; the second term to children living in liquidity constrained 
households who are enrolled in school; the third term to children living in non-liquidity constrained 
households who are not enrolled in school; the last term to children living in liquidity constrained 
households who are not enrolled in school. Maximum likelihood estimation of (A13) yields 
consistent estimates of 1221 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ ρββ . 
These parameter estimates are used to construct 1ˆλ  and 2ˆλ  for each child, either living in liquidity 
constrained households and not living in liquidity constrained households. These can be inserted 
into eqs. (A9) and (A12) to yield the selection corrected school hours equations: 
 
( ) ( ) uuuuuuuuiuiui vDDyE 332211332133 ,,| σλθλθ +++′= βxx ;  ( ) 01,0| 213 === DDvE u   (A14) 
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( ) ( ) ccccccccicici vDDyE 332211332133 ,,| σλθλθ +++′= βxx ;  ( ) 01,1| 213 === DDvE c   (A15) 
 
Eqs. (A14) and (A15) is fit by ordinary least squares regression of iy3  on i3x  and the constructed 
variables 1ˆλ  and 2ˆλ  for those children who are both living in liquidity constrained and non-liquidity 
constrained households. Finally, estimates of the correlation coefficients 12ρ  and 13ρ  are obtained 
by solving the equations for 1θ  and 2θ  given in eqs. (A9) and (A12). 
 
Annex A.3. Oaxaca Decomposition 
  
Once the dependent variable and the model parameters are consistently estimated, the effect of 
credit regime on the number of hours at school can be decomposed into several components. In 
particular, three terms can be identified (Neuman and Oaxaca, 2002) such that: 
            (A16) 
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where ( )∑
=
=
uN
i
u
iu
u yNy 1 33 1 , ( )∑ == cNi cicc yNy 1 33 1  are the predicted means of the number of hours 
children living in liquidity unconstrained and constrained households spent at school, respectively; 
( )∑
=
=
uN
i
u
iu
u N 1 33 1 xx , ( )∑ == cNi cicc N 1 33 1 xx  are the predicted means of the vectors of characteristics for 
children living in liquidity unconstrained and constrained households, respectively; uN  and cN  are 
the size of children within the liquidity unconstrained and constrained households, respectively. The 
first term in equation (A16) corresponds to the differences between the number of hours spent at 
school by children in liquidity constrained and unconstrained households attributable to explanatory 
variables (explained component); the second term in equation (A16) represents behavioral 
differences between children in liquidity constrained and unconstrained households (unexplained 
component); the third and fourth terms can be thought of as the differences due to, respectively, 
observed and unobserved self-selection into credit regime; the last two terms can be thought of as 
the differences due to, respectively, observed and unobserved self-selection in school enrolment.  
 
